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PEACE AND PUBLIC ORDER: INTERNATIONAL
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE "THE CANADIAN WAY'
ROBERT

J.

CURRIEt

One of the fastest-growing trends in the battle against transnational crime is
the conclusion of mutual legal assistance treaties between states. These
conventions provide a framework for inter-jurisdictional evidence gathering,
allowing for formalized cooperation in criminal investigations through a
system of requests for assistance between national authorities. Canadian
practice in this area has remained largely unscrutinized, but presents an
interesting duality: while the courts of the land have liberally interpreted the
powers of the government to fa/fill requests from other countries, the making
of requests by Canadian authorities has been fraught with difficulty,
particularly with regard to the rights ofcitizens under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. The author surveys the legislative and judicial
perspectives on mutual legal assistance, with particular emphasis on the
Federal Court ofAppeal's recent decision in Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney
General), and concludes that overzealous application of Charter principles
threatens to undermine the state's ability to combat transnational crime.
Une des orientations !es plus jlorissantes dans la lutte contre le crime
international s'avere etre la conclusion de traites d'assistance mutuelle legale
entre !es Etats. Ces conventions presentent une structure pour la collecte de
preuves entre !es dif!erentes juridictions, permettant une cooperation formelle
dans !es enquetes criminelles par l'entremise d'un systeme de demande
d'assistance entre !es autorites nationales. La pratique canadienne ace niveau
demeure peu analysee mais presente neanmoins une dualiti interessante:
malgre le fait que !es tribunaux du pays interpretent de far;on liberale le
pouvoir du gouvernement de s 'acquitter des demandes d 'assistance des autres
Etats, ces memes tribunaux portent un jugement defavorable aux demandes
d'assistance presentees par !es autorites canadiennes, particulierement en

t BA Hons. (St. F.X.), M.A. (Carleton), LLB. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie).
The author is indebted to Professors Hugh Kindred and Bruce Archibald,
Dalhousie Law School, for invaluable counsel and comments. The author also
gratefully acknowledges the assistance and goodwill of Mr. Jerry Pitzul, Director
of Public Prosecution, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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regard des droits accordes par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertes.
L 'auteur sonde la perspective legislative et judiciaire quant a !'issue de
!assistance mutuelle legale, accordant une attention particuliere a la recente
decision de la Cour federale d'appel dans l'arret Schreiber c. Canada
(Procureur General). L 'auteur conclut que ! 'application excessive des
dispositions de la Charte sape l'habilete de l'Etat a combattre le crime
international

I. INTRODUCTION
1. Modern Trends in International Judicial Assistance

With the increasing globalization of world affairs, the opening of
borders for economic purposes, and the advent of instantaneous
communications technology has come a corresponding increase in
both the amount and sophistication of transnational crime. 1 As the
global community becomes more tightly knit, governments and
criminal authorities are becoming increasingly aware of the
problems presented by the ability of the modern-day criminal to
take advantage of dated notions of state sovereignty m
confounding the enforcement of criminal law:
Each day, it becomes painfully clear to the police and the
judiciary how great the energy, speed, mobility and
sophistication of offenders are and, by contrast, how
difficult it is to overcome the barriers created for the
police and the judiciary out of differences in national
legal systems and out-moded concepts of national
sovereignty. 2

Equally apparent has been the corresponding need for
governments to overcome the barriers systemic to inter-state
relations through cooperation in criminal matters. The difficulties
1 As

a trend, international crime has increased in amount during the last few
decades to the extent that Interpol has a publication dedicated to tracking the
increase; see Interpol Secretariat, International Crime Statistics (Paris:
International Criminal Police Organization, 1993).
2 P. Wilkitzki, "Development of an Effective International Crime and Justice
Programme-a European View," in A Eser and 0. Lagodny eds., Principles and
Procedures for a New Transnational Criminal Law (Freiburg: Max Planck
Institute, 1992) 267 at 270.
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have been numerous, stemming primarily from the fact that
criminal jurisdiction remains one of the most closely guarded
aspects of sovereignty; 3 such a narrow focus has allowed organized
crime in particular to prosper. While collaboration on this front has
its origins in more practically oriented and informal systems such as
that maintained by Interpol, 4 both state governments and
international organizations have become active in fostering bilateral
and multilateral efforts at synchronizing legal mechanisms,
enhancing what has become known as "international judicial
assistance." Most recently, the PS Senior Experts Group on
Transnational Organized Crime called on states to review their
legislative schemes, as well as crime prevention and enforcement
systems, "to ensure that the special problems created by
Transnational Organized Crime are effectively addressed."5
On the domestic front, the Supreme Court of Canada has given
authoritative approval to Canada's participation in this emerging
international legal regime:
The investigation, prosecution and suppression of crime
for the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of
peace and public order is an important goal of all
organized societies. The pursuit of that goal cannot
realistically be confined within national boundaries. That
has long been the case, but it is increasingly evident
today. 6

3 "States have a tendency to think that anything connected with criminal law,
even quite minor procedural matters, affects national sovereignty." R. Dussaix,
"Some Problems Arising from the Practical Application, from the Judicial Point of
View, of the European Convention on M urual Assistance in Legal Matters", in
European Committee on Crime Problems, Problems Arising from the Practical
Application ofthe European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,
cited in W. Gilmore ed., Mutual Assistance in Criminal and Business Regulatory
Matters (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at xiii.
4 See M. Anderson, Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International
Police Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); F. Bresler, Interpol (New
York: Viking Press, 1992).
5 Senior Expert Group on Transnational Organized Crime, "PS Senior Experts
Group Recommendations" (12 April 1996) at para. 1 [unpublished]. The PS is
composed of the G 7 countries and Russia.
6 United States ofAmerica v. Cotroni (1989), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 215.
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The Canadian government has been active in this regard, having
been an early participant in efforts to coordinate extradition, the
first pillar of international judicial assistance/ Indeed, in 1988 the
federal Department of Justice set up a separate division among its
ranks to handle legal cooperation with other states. 8
This essay will explore Canada's cooperative mechanisms with
regard to the provision of mutual legal assistance, the lesser-known
but increasingly important bedfellow of extradition in the fight
against international crime, and a subject upon which there is a
dearth of Canadian legal literature. A survey of the context in
which Canada finds itself internationally will be followed by an
examination of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
Act, 9 which provides the legislative foundation for national efforts.
This analysis will be accompanied by a look at jurisprudence on
various sections of the Act, as well as cases dealing with procedural
matters. Also, several corollary issues will be addressed, including
the rights of the defence in such arrangements.
This examination will go towards demonstrating that,
consistent with other Canadian international legal practice, the
effectiveness of Canada's mutual legal assistance efforts has been
limited by both legal and policy perspectives which are primarily
inward-looking and focused on Canadian sovereignty. That this is
at odds with Canada's traditionally internationalist outlook seems
obvious. Victories which have been achieved in the battle against
transnational crime appear to have been gained in spite of, rather
than facilitated by, domestic court interpretation of the legislative
scheme that provides the primary tools. Despite the Supreme
Court's professed interest in "peace and public order" both
domestically and internationally, Canada's commitment to

7 See generally G. Gilbert, Aspects of Extradition Law (Dordrecht, Neth.: M.
Nijhoff, 1991). On Canada, see A. Laforest, LaForest's Extradition to and from
Canada (Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1991).
8 The International Assistance Group (!AG) seems to have adopted LaForest's
dictum from Cotroni as something of a "mission statement"; see e.g. Department of
Justice, International Assistance Group: Central Authority for Canada for Mutual
Legal Assistance and Extradition (Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services, 1995) at 3.
9 R.S.C. 1985, 4th Supp., c. 30.
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constitutionalism remains determinative; this fact is all the more
important in a post-Charter10 Canada.

2. Mutual Legal Assistance Defined
Mutual legal assistance is a practice that is well known to inter-state
relations; however, it has traditionally been viewed as the
responsibility of the diplomat, rather than the bureaucrat.
Operating on a system of letters rogatory, 11 diplomats and ranking
state officials made requests of their international counterparts that
domestic legal matters (almost exclusively of the civil variety)
which involve the jurisdiction of another state be expedited by that
state. For example, where certain evidence for a case in Country A
was within the territory of Country B, the diplomats of the former
would make a written request of those of the latter for the
transmission of the evidence. The practice has, of late, shed its
cumbersome diplomatic origins and been adapted by the
administrators of justice into a means of relatively expedient
cooperation. However, in the criminal context, despite its becoming
"the fastest growing business in the criminal justice field," 12
" ... mutual legal assistance ... has no obvious place in the legal
categories familiar to common lawyers. It lies rather forlornly in a
no man's land between private international law on the one hand
and criminal procedure on the other." 13
For present purposes, it is suitable to adopt W. Gilmore's
definition of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters: "the
process whereby one state provides assistance to another in the
investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. " 14 This
definition includes what Gilmore describes as "such unglamourous
but highly practical matters" 1s as the provision of evidence,
10

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (u.K.) 1982, c.11.
II See Part III .1 below.
12 K. Prost, "Breaking Down Barriers: International Cooperation In
Combatting Transnational Crime," (Paper delivered to the International
Association of Prosecutors Conference), Ottawa (2 September 1997) [unpublished].
l3 0. McClean, International judicial Assistance (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992) at 119.
14 W. Gilmore, supra note 3 at xii.
is Ibid.
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documentary or viva voce, for use abroad; the search and seizure of
evidence for use in foreign proceedings; the transfer of witnesses for
interview; and the serving of documents originating in another
jurisdiction. It is to be distinguished from extradition (which is
subject to a customary and treaty law regime of its own), the
enforcement of foreign criminal judgments generally, and such
informal networks as exist between criminal justice authorities. The
present focus will also exclude inter-state cooperation in the
confiscation of the proceeds of crime which, while related in
substance, has a separate body of international instruments and
literature. 16

II. THE MULTILATERAL CONTEXT OF
COOPERATION

One of the founding blocks of mutual legal assistance, as well as the
first positive indication that states might be willing to compromise
on the exclusivity of their criminal jurisdictions, was the 1959
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 17 an
agreement which set the basis for practice thereafter. Remarkable in
its foresight and impact on subsequent developments, it is also
noteworthy as an agreement which was sufficiently flexible to meet
the needs of the various legal systems in Europe. 18 The Convention
was able to sail into territory previously uncharted by the
cooperative mechanisms which had developed around the practices
of extradition, and to develop mechanisms for cooperation which
required neither dual criminality19 nor the existence of an
extraditable offence. This ability was justified by the Explanatory
Report on the Convention on the basis that in this area, unlike the
extradition context, there was no concern about violation of the

16 See generally W. Gilmore, ed., International Efforts to Combat Money
Laundering (Cambridge: Grotius, 1992).
17 Eur. T. S. 30 [hereinafter European Convention].
18 Including the common law system of the U.K., which became a parry in 1990.
l9 The notion that any offence under investigation must constitute a penal offence
in both (or all) involved jurisdictions-a key feature of extradition treaties. See
Gilbert, supra note 7 and Laforest, supra note 7.
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rights of the individual. 20 While the Convention represented a
positive start, its effectiveness was somewhat limited by state parties
registering reservations to several provisions; moreover, it was
supplanted for some states by networks of bilateral treaties
concluded subsequently. 21
The Convention is of little relevance to the modern Canadian
perspective, as it has been largely supplanted by mechanisms of
greater scope and effectiveness in subsequent decades. It did,
however, lay precedents for many techniques of mutual legal
assistance currently in use, including the requirement that contact
be made between "central authorities" of cooperating states
(generally located in the departments of justice) as a means of
providing speed and consistency. 22 The modes of assistance
discussed above 23 are all accounted for as part of the main
provisions, as well as the exchange of information on the criminal
records of parties involved in a judicial matter. 24 Also noteworthy
are the bases for refusal of assistance, which include the grounds
that the offence being prosecuted is a political offence, 25 or that
providing assistance would be "likely to prejudice the sovereignty,
security, ordre public or other essential interests of its country. " 26
1. The Commonwealth Scheme

The second major multilateral effort at judicial assistance came
during the mid-1980s when the Commonwealth countries took
advantage of their traditional cultural and legal27 linkages to create
the Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within
the Commonwealth, ratified in Vancouver in October, 1987. 28 It
was incumbent upon the framers of the device to take account of
20 Cited

in McClean, supra note 13 at 131: See also Gilmore, supra note 3 at xiii.
Gilmore, supra note 3 at xv.
22 European Convention, supra note 17, art. 15.
23 See the Gilmore definition, supra note 14 and accompanying text ..
24 European Convention, supra note 17, art. 22.
25 Ibid. art. 2(a).
26 Jbid. art. 2(b).
27 For example, the Commonwealth Fraud Liaison Service.
28 Jnfra note 29. For a discussion of this scheme see McClean, "Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters: The Commonwealth Initiative," (1988) 37 Int'! & Comp.
21

L.Q 177.
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the "sensitivity" of the criminal law context, given the members'
"different judgments on the balance to be struck between the
interests of the State and the civil liberties of individuals." 29 As such,
the Commonwealth Scheme is not a legally binding international
agreement, but an agreed-upon set of principles which can shape the
nature of criminal cooperation between member states.
The Scheme expands upon the European Convention in both
form and content, providing for nine discrete heads of assistance to
be furnished to requesting members. These include, in addition to
the more "standard" techniques outlined earlier, identification and
location of persons, effecting the temporary transfer of persons in
custody to appear as witnesses, and the tracing, seizure, and
forfeiting of the proceeds of criminal activities. 30 A request may be
made upon a criminal matter arising in the requesting country if: 1)
proceedings have been instituted; or 2) the Central Authority can
demonstrate "reasonable cause to believe that an offence ... has been
committed. "31
Also fleshed out are the grounds for refusal of assistance, which
include an absence of dual criminality, 32 a political offence
exception, a ordre public ground similar to that in the European
Convention, double jeopardy, and discretionary refusal "where
compliance would facilitate the prosecution or punishment of any
person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political
opinions .... "33 Further, paragraph 7(3) states that if the procedure
requested is unavailable in that jurisdiction then there is no
29 Commonwealth Secretariat, Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth, with commentary by D. McClean
and W.J. Menary (Cambridge: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988) [hereinafter
Commonwealth Scheme] at 1.
30 Ibid. para. 1(3).
3l Ibid. para. 3(1). The commentary by Professor McClean, at 21, notes that the
definition of"offence" in para. 3(2) as a transgression of "the laws of a country, or
any part thereof' was "inserted to clarify the position in federal or composite
countries, and was originally prompted by Canadian difficulties on this point."
32 McClean notes that emerging from the preparatory discussions for the
Scheme was the idea that this requirement, in para. 7(l)(a), was in fact discretionary
in character. This would both "ease the constitutional difficulties" of some
countries and allow states not to be party to "harsher criminal regime[s]." See
McLean, supra note 13 at 155-56.
33 Para. 7(1)-(2).
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obligation on that state to grant the request by conforming to the
norms of the requesting country.
Canada was an original party to the Commonwealth Scheme,
and exerted its influence in several ways. First, a draft of Canada's
bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty with the u.s. 34 was used as a
model by the Scheme's drafters.35 Second, rather oddly in the
context of a non-binding agreement, Canada registered five
"reservations and clarifications" requmng that requests for
assistance, as well as the compelled attendance of an accused before
a Commission examining witnesses per paragraph 16(3), be
accompanied by letters rogatory. 36 The Commentary to the
Scheme, however, speaks approvingly of Canada's creativity m
bending the international agreement to its federal-state agenda:
[T]he Canadian position favours fully negotiated
bilateral mutual assistance treaties where such treaties are
appropriate, e.g. where a neighbouring country is likely
to make regular requests for assistance.... However, it
also provides a machinery under which a request for
assistance from a non-Treaty country, such as one under
the Scheme, can be made the subject of an
"administrative arrangement" with the legal effect of a
temporary treaty.. .. It will be seen that this fully serves
the purposes of the Commonwealth Scheme, while
adopting procedures on the Canadian side which give a
better 'fit' with existing Canadian legislation and
practice. 37
Thus, in a manner of speaking, Canada has reshaped the
Commonwealth Scheme in its own image, as indicated by the
integration of preferences peculiar to the Canadian perspective. Yet
the requirement for letters rogatory to accompany any request
made under the arrangement seems to maintain, at least in form,
the kind of barrier to efficiency that the Scheme was designed to
circumvent.

34 Infra note 63.
35 Commonwealth

at 54.
37 Ibid. at 55.
36 Ibid.

Scheme, supra note 29 at 3.

100

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

2. Regional Cooperation: The Inter-American Convention
Canada is also a party to the Inter-American Convention On Mutual
Assistance In Criminal Matters, 38 adopted in Nassau on May 23,
1992. An effort at cooperation among the countries of the western
hemisphere, the Inter-American Convention represents an expansion
on the form and substance of earlier arrangements. It contains fairly
developed sets of procedures pertaining to service of documents
and appearance of witnesses,39 transmittal of information and
records, 40 and the making of a request. 41 The grounds for refusal,
set out in article 9, appear to reflect an evolution in certain respects;
the article does not contain a dual criminality requirement, 42 but
does allow a state to refuse assistance where "[t]he request has been
issued at the request of a special or ad hoc tribunal." 43 The various
provisions are in fact detailed enough that the treaty may supplant
the need for further bilateral arrangements, although time and state
practice will be determinative. Such a multilateral instrument would
normally be expected to replace any existing arrangements between
state parties. However, as between certain countries there are often
preferences as to which treaty is relied upon; Canada and the u.s.,
for example, are more likely to rely on their bilateral treaty for
requests between them.44

3. United Nations Mechanisms
Throughout its history the United Nations has been actively
engaged in the formulation and implementation of criminal justice
standards. Through the work of the Secretariat of the Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Division, and its attendant expert
advisory group, the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control,
the United Nations has laboured to raise the visibility of crime38 OA.S.T.S. [hereinafter the Inter-American Convention] No. 1975; Canada
Gazette Part I, 2483 (Vol. 130, No. 35; 31August1996). The Convention came into
force for Canada on 3July1996.
39 Chapter I II.
4 Chapter IV.
41 Chapter V.
42 Now the rule rather than the exception; see Gilmore, supra note 3 at xii.
43 Article 9(c).
44 Jnfra note 65 and accompanying text.

°
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related issues and enhance international cooperation in the area.45 In
addition to the formulation of resolutions and the drafting of
international criminal law instruments, through the auspices of
Ecosoc the Secretariat published the Compendium of United
Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal
justice. 46 With the recent addition of the University of British
Columbia Law School to the Secretariat's Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice Program Network of Institutes, the Canadian
presence in this policy area is likely to be strengthened. 47
The most widespread affirmation of the concept of mutual
legal assistance, albeit in the context of a particular class of crime,
appeared in 1988 with the signing of the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. 48
The Convention contains a "stand-alone" provision on mutual legal
assistance to be provided between state parties in narcotics matters,
and is intended to complement (or at least not affect) existing state
practice on such matters. 49 For states without established practice,
paragraphs 8-19 of article 7 lay out a regime which is similar in
form to the Commonwealth Scheme. The grounds for refusal are
more limited in this convention than in others, likely in an effort to
compensate for what McClean describes as "the danger. .. that
sufficient weight will not be given to the intention to make a real
advance in the level of co-operation in the drugs field, and that preexisting practices and attitudes will be relied upon unthinkingly. "so
In 1990 the United Nations expanded its activities in the area
of mutual legal assistance by publishing the Model Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,5 1 which would furnish
45

For a good survey and an examination of legal implications, see R. Clark,
"United Nations Standards and Nor ms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,"
(1995) 5 Transnat. L. & Contemp. Problems 287.
46 (1992) U.N. Sales No. EE.92.IV.l.
47 The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform is located at the
U niversityofBritish Columbia: see web site "www.law.ubc.ca/centres/icclr.htm."
48 28 1989 I.L.M.493. The Convention currently has 144 signatories, including
Canada.
49 Article 7(6).
50 D. McClean, supra note 13 at 178.
5! In Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment ofOffenders, U.N. Doc.NCONF.144/28 (1990).
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countries wishing to enter into a bilateral
based on the Commonwealth Scheme. 52
Model Treaty contains provisions allowing
fears prejudice to sovereignty, security,
essential public interests.53 It also contains
proceeds of crime.

treaty with an example
Standard in form, the
for refusal where a state
ordre public or other
an optional protocol on

Ill. THE BILATERAL CONTEXT OF COOPERATION
1. Letters Rogatory
As noted above,54 the system utilized by states for the provision of
mutual legal assistance prior to the conclusion of treaties was the use
of letters rogatory.55 Used primarily for the enforcement of civil
judgments, the system involved an official request made through
diplomatic channels for the provision of assistance by a foreign
government, which would then be passed down to the relevant
justice ministry for implementation. As a means of combatting
crime, the process was cumbersome, limited in scope, and
potentially fraught with political problems, particularly within the
closely guarded criminal jurisdictional setting.56
The basis for this mode of cooperation at international law is
found in the principle of comity.57 Comity recognizes the mutual
interest of states in their reciprocal cooperation on matters that fall
within national jurisdiction. This was recognized by u.s. Chief
Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon and Others5 8
when he explained that, despite the exclusive jurisdiction of a state
within its own territory, reciprocal state assistance occurs as a matter
of common interest. This principle was confirmed in Canada by the
52

R. Clark, "Crime: The UN Agenda on International Cooperation in the
Criminal Process" (1991) 15 Nova LR. 475, 490-93.
53 Model Treaty, supra note 51,Art. 4(l)(a).
54 See Part 1:2, above.
55 S. A. Williams and J. G. Castel, Canadian Criminal Law: International and
Transnational Aspects (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) at 321-332.
56See Prost, supra note 12at18.
57 See generally? Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North
Holland, 1984) at 41-44.
58 (1812), 7 Cranch's Rep. 116 at 136-37.
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Supreme Court in Zingre v. The Queen et af.,59 and in fact
Canadian practice continues on this basis. Those countries with
which Canada has no treaty or Commonwealth obligations will
generally be fairly "low traffic" when it comes to requests for
assistance. Accordingly, their requests will generally be expected in
the form of letters rogatory. The process is faster than it has been
historically, however, due to the Department of Justice's
functioning as a Central Authority for these requests.GO

2. Bilateral Treaties

In 1973, during the period of years between the conclusions of the
European Convention and the Commonwealth Scheme, the United
States and Switzerland concluded the first bilateral treaty on
mutual legal assistance. 61 This instrument was extremely influential
with respect to later efforts, including the Commonwealth Scheme,
and may be noted as the first successful bridging of the gap
between states of differing legal traditions.62
Given the immense shared border and the multitude of
common interests in law enforcement between Canada and the u.s.,
it is not surprising that both parties were moved to conclude the
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters63 in 1985.
This treaty has been utilized by nearly every jurisdiction in Canada
and has proven to be such an effective mechanism for inter-state
cooperation in criminal matters that within five years of operation it

[1981] 2 S.C.R. 392.
Department ofJ ustice, Law enforcement in the global village: a manual for
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (Ottawa: Dept. of Supply and Services,
1990).
61 Treaty between the United States ofAmerica and the Swiss Confederation on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 25May1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, TIAS 8302.
62 See L. Frei & S. Freschal, "Origins and Application of the United StatesSwitzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters," (1990) 31 Harvard
Int. L.J. 77; E. Nadelmann, "Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties," 33
Am.]. of Comp. L. 467 (1985).
63 18 March 1989 Can. T.S. 1990, No. 19; 24 I.L.M. 1092 (1985). In force for
Canada 24 January 1990.
59

GO See
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had supplanted all but the most informal of police links as the
preferred means of contact. 64
The Canada-US. Treaty is comprehensive in scope and provides
a greater degree of integration of systems than some other
agreements of its kind, while maintaining certain national quirks.
Article II(3) specifically eliminates the requirement of dual
criminality, and article III(2) states that "in exceptional
circumstances," assistance may be provided "in respect of illegal
acts that do not constitute an offence within the definition of
offence in article I." 65 Interestingly, article II(4) notes that the
Treaty "shall not give rise to a right on the part of a private party to
obtain, suppress or exclude any evidence or to impede the
execution of a request." The text of the Treaty itself thereby
explicitly limits its use to government bodies, potentially
precluding privately initiated anti-trust actions in the u.s. As C.
Goldman and J. Kissack note, the disclosure requirements
stemming from Stinchcombe v. R. 66 "would probably require
disclosure to an accused in Canada of information received from
the United States."67
Article V sets out a fairly limited set of grounds for refusal,
which can occur only when the request is not made in conformity
with the Treaty provisions, 68 where execution of the request would
be contrary to "public interest" ,69 or if execution would interfere
with an ongoing investigation or prosecution in the requested
state.7° Notably absent are both a double jeopardy exception and
any provision similar to the Commonwealth Scheme's discretionary
64 Author's interview with Mr. RodneyT. Stamler, Executive Division Director
(retired), Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 29 March 1992.
65 Article I defines "offence" as:
a) for Canada, ... a law of Parliament that may be prosecuted upon
indictment, or an offence created by the Legislature of a Province ...
b) for the United States, an offence for which the statutory penalty is a
term of imprisonment of one year or more ....
66 (1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
67 C. Goldman & J. Kissack, "Current Issues in Cross-Border Criminal
Investigations: A Canadian Perspective" (1996) 16 Canadian Competition Record
81at100.
68 Arr. V(l)(a).
69 Arr. V(l)(b).
70 Arr. V(2).
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"human rights exception," most likely attributable to the similarity
of legal systems between the two parties, as well as historically
friendly relations. The absence of even a discretionary dual
criminality requirement, however, significantly cuts down the bases
upon which Canada could refuse to render assistance. This raises
the interesting possibility that Canada could provide evidence for
use in a u.s. prosecution that would result in the death penalty upon
conviction.
The provisions of the Treaty dealing with the ofrencontroversial area of costs have also made an impact upon treaties
concluded by other jurisdictions. 71 Article VII states that the
requested state shall assume all costs for activities conducted within
its boundaries, with
the
exceptions
of expert
fees,
translation/transcription expenses, and travel and incidental
expenses of persons travelling to the requested state to attend the
execution of a request (such as a witness). 72 Also notable is the
Treaty's Annex, which contains an explicit extension of cooperation
to the quasi-criminal context, in such areas of provincial jurisdiction
as securities, wildlife protection, environmental protection, and
consumer protection. This allows the provinces to makes requests
for assistance in pursuit of statutory offences, though as will be
explained below, all such requests must be routed through the
federal Department of Justice.
The Canada-U.S. Treaty demonstrated a certain amount of
success in efforts to secure mutual legal assistance, and Canada has
actively pursued similar arrangements on both the bilateral and
multilateral levels. Canada now has its own model treaty for use in
bilateral negotiations, 73 and is currently party to eight international
conventions (including the Commonwealth Scheme), as well as ten
bilateral treaties.74 Moreover, efforts to form further relationships in
compelling areas are ongoing; for instance, federal officials are

See McClean, supra note 13 at 162.
VII (l)(a)-(c).
73 Canadian Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (March,
1991), reprinted in Gilmore, supra note 3 at 239.
74 Author's interview with M. Jacques Lemeer, International Assistance Group
(IAG), Department of] ustice, Ottawa, 5 October 1997.
7l

72 Art.
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currently negotiating a mutual legal assistance treaty with Russia,75
presumably in an effort to deal with the spread of Russian
organized crime networks into Canada.76
IV. CANADIAN DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION
AND APPLICATION

Having described the nature and scope of Canada's international
obligations respecting mutual legal assistance, an inquiry must be
made into how smoothly the system functions. Of particular
relevance in the criminal setting is the degree to which the courts of
the land will permit such obligations to interfere with the rights and
privileges of Canadians. Such an examination is illuminating, as it
reveals an intriguing duality in the perspective of the courts. First, as
the following discussion will illustrate, the judiciary has facilitated
the government's ability to respond to requests for mutual legal
assistance from other states, essentially through a liberal
interpretation of the powers given to police and prosecutors under
the enabling legislation. Conversely, as will be shown in Part V,
below, requests for assistance initiated by Canada are met with
judicial reluctance to allow Canadian authorities to proceed with
anything less than extreme caution. That this reluctance largely
stems from the Charter is perhaps not surprising.
1. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act
It is characteristic of Canadian law that for international legal
obligations entered into by treaty to have effect in domestic law,
they must be incorporated into the legislative scheme through the
enactment of a statute. This approach to implementation of
international law has been labelled "transformationist,'' a view
"clearly springing from following the British legal tradition that
treaties must be enacted into law by Parliament before they will

75 Alan Cassell, United Nations Treaty Law and Criminal Division OLA), Dept.
of Foreign Affairs, (Remarks to the Canadian Council on International Law
Annual Conference, Ottawa, 16 October, 1997).
76 See generally S. Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia New Mafiya (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
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affect private rights." 77 Canada's legal obligations regarding mutual
legal assistance have been implemented via the Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act,78 which received royal assent on
July 28th, 1988. The Act provides the legislative basis upon which
the Department of Justice (Canada's "Central Authority") is to
organize its activities to meet requests for assistance under the
various instruments to which Canada is a party.79 It is designed
simply to create an ability to provide assistance where it is requested
by other states, since the response to requests for assistance by
Canada will be the preserve of the requested states. 80
Consistent with Canada's preference for bilateral treaty
relationships, 81 the Act allows "administrative arrangements" to be
entered into with countries that are not in treaty relationships with
Canada, enabling the provision of assistance with respect to specific
investigations. 82 These arrangements are implemented by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the same manner as treaties, 83 and last
for up to six months. 84 The rationale for such "mini-treaties" is
slightly mysterious, though one might speculate that they function
to keep inter-state mutual legal assistance firmly in the federal
sphere. Another interpretation would be that these administrative
arrangements legitimate interference with citizens by the state
where no crime has been committed on Canadian soil, illustrating
for the courts the necessity and appropriateness of such action. This
also serves to lend a strong domestic character to the entire
transaction, insofar as Canadian policy preferences dictate both how

77 H.M. Kindred et al. eds., International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and
Applied in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993) at 148.
78R.S.C.1985 (4thSupp.),c.30.
79 Section 3(2) of the Act, however, notes that these relationships will not
"abrogate or derogate from an agreement, arrangement or practice" on an informal
basis. This preserves the functioning oflnterpol, as well as ad hoc links which police
or prosecutors may form.
80 But see the discussion of Schreiber, infra note 123 and accompanying text,
with regard to the process followed for those requests.
SI SeeMcClean,supra note29.
82 Section 6(1).
83 Section 6(3).
84 Section 6(4).
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the request is to be filled "on the ground," and on what terms the
two government agencies will communicate.

i. Search and Seizure/Taking of Evidence
Sections 10-16 of the Act provide the circumstances under which
Canadian authorities will execute a search warrant and seize
evidence for a foreign proceeding. When a request for assistance is
approved by the Minister of Justice, relevant documentation is
provided to the "competent authority" 85 of the jurisdiction in which
the search and seizure is to take place, 86 who will then apply ex pa rte
for a search warrant to a judge of the province "in which the
competent authority believes that evidence of the commission of
the offence may be found." 87 The judge may issue the warrant
where he or she is satisfied that "an offence has been committed
with respect to which the foreign state has jurisdiction,'' 88 and must
fix the time and place for a hearing subsequent to the execution of
the warrant. 89 In the hearing, the judge may order the return of any
material seized if he or she is not satisfied that the warrant was
properly executed, 90 or may order that the record or thing seized be
turned over to the foreign state with such conditions attached as the
judge sees fit for the preservation of the item or the protection of
third parties.9 1
Complementary to the search and seizure provisions are sections
17-23 which govern the taking of evidence for use abroad by less
coercive means than a search warrant. Apprised of the potential
existence of evidence through a process similar to that followed in a

85 Defined ins.

2 as "the Attorney General of Canada, the attorney general of a
province or any person or authority with responsibility in Canada for the
investigation or prosecution of offences."
86 Section 11 (1).
87 Section 11 (2).
88 Section 12(l)(a).
89 Section 12(3). Interestingly, s.13 provides that the peace officer executing the
warrant may also seize anything he or she finds that "will afford evidence of, has
been obtained by or used in or is intended to be used in the commission of an
offence."
90 Section l 5(l)(a).
91Section15(l)(b), 15(2).
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search and seizure,92 a judge may order the examination of any
person, or order any person to produce documentary evidence, "in
order to give effect to the request." 93 The person may refuse to
answer any questions or to produce documents on the following
bases: if the refusal is based on Canadian law (e.g., the privilege
against self-incrimination); if requiring the person to answer
questions or produce evidence would be a breach of privilege under
the law of the requesting state (an interesting concession to that
state's jurisdiction); or, if the actual answering of questions or
production of evidence would be an offence in the requesting
state. 94 However, such refusal must be justified by the party before
a judge, who may determine that the refusal under Canadian law is
not well-founded and order the person to answer the questions or
provide the evidence requested.95
These provisions of the Act have been the subjects of recent
litigation, and the results have been noteworthy primarily due to
their confirmation of the powers of the Crown under treaty and
within the scheme of the Act. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Ross%
the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that, for a court to
grant an order of transmission, Canadian authorities taking
evidence under the Act (whether through seizure under sections 1016 or obtained under section 18) need not show that the evidence
will be admissible at trial in the requesting state. In R. v. Rutherford
Ltd.,97 the police had been engaged in negotiations with the
manager of the company under investigation, who had been
offering to turn over evidence in exchange for prosecutorial
immunity. When search warrants were issued pursuant to the Act to
allow a search of the company premises, the company and manager
applied to quash the warrants, claiming that the Crown had not
disclosed the aforementioned negotiations to the Court in their
application. They submitted that provision of this evidence would
92Section 17, 18(1).
93 Section 18(2).
94 Section l 8(7)(a)-(c). Section 43 of the Act provides that where a similar
refusal is made bya party in a foreign state, "a judge may determine the validity of
the refusal on application ... by a Canadian competent authority."
95 Section 19(3).
% (1994), 44 B.CA.C. 228, 71 W A.C. 228 (B.C.CA.).
97 (1995), 101 C.C.C. (3d) 26 (B.C.S.C.).
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have shown that examination under section 18 was more
appropriate. The Court held that the withheld evidence only
strengthened the case for a search warrant, as the manager's plea for
immunity showed that he was likely to have withheld evidence
under a section 18 inquiry, and dismissed the application to quash.
In United Kingdom v. James & Boyden,98 the Canadian police
were acting under a section 18 order in an investigation of R., a u.K.
citizen with Canadian business dealings. Section 18(5) of the Act
permits "third parties" to apply to have the order set aside if they
can assert a proprietary interest in the evidence, among other
grounds. Upon R.'s application under this section, the Court found
that the words "third parties" were not to be interpreted to include
the party under investigation, who had neither a constitutional right
to privacy nor common law standing to challenge the investigation
process.
Cases involving the constitutional rights of the party under
investigation have also been won by the Crown. In United Kingdom
v. Hrynyk99 the respondent was alleged to have had business
dealings with a party being investigated for bankruptcy fraud in the
u .K. Hrynyk was ordered to attend a section 18 examination and to
furnish documents relating to transactions with the foreign accused.
Under section 18(6) he applied for and received use and derivative
use immunity for his evidence, but continued to refuse to answer
questions on the basis that the order and the Act violated the right
to remain silent under section 7 of the Charter. The Court, noting
that section 18(5) of the Act allows a judge to impose conditions
upon evidence to protect the interests of compelled witnesses,
found that the immunity granted to Hrynyk provided the proper
balance of the interests of the individual and the state. The
compelled testimony in this case would not have put the party in
personal jeopardy, and therefore did not infringe his section 7
rights. 100

98

(1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 41 C.B.R. (3d) 124 (Ont. CA.).
(1996), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 104, 135 D.L.R. (4th) 693 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
IOO A similar ruling had been made earlier by the Quebec Supreme Court in
Etats-Unis d'Amr!rique c. Ross, [1995] R.J .Q. 1680.
99
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ii. Appeals
Section 35 of the Act allows an appeal on a question of law alone
"from any order or decision of a judge or a court in Canada made
under this Act," provided leave of the Court of Appeal is granted.
This provision has been narrowed in at least one instance, 101 where
the Court held that the question of whether section 18 evidence
gathering should be ordered instead of a search warrant is at best a
mixed question of law and fact. In a different case, the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal recently outlined the test to be applied as to
whether leave to appeal should be granted:
Is the question raised not settled by authority? Is it of
importance generally and, if not of importance generally,
is it nonetheless of great importance to a person with
serious interests, such as his liberty, at stake? Does the
proposition of law put forward have any merit? Are there
any discretionary conditions, such as prejudice to either
the applicant or the requesting state, which are required
to be taken into account? 102

The language of "serious interests, such as ... liberty" suggests the
importance of the Charter rights as "questions of law" when
deciding whether or not to allow an appeal. The latter part of the
test, however, denotes a willingness on the part of the Court to
accommodate the interests of the requesting state even on a
question of law. Such flexibility indicates that courts may be
disposed towards facilitating Canada's compliance with its
"requested-state" obligations.
2. Collateral Issues

i. Expanding Information-Gathering: The Role of the Defence
As demonstrated above, mutual legal assistance is an intergovernmental cooperative mechanism which has been given the
authority of international law. By making the provision of
information a matter of international comity or obligation, it allows
101 Heafeyc. Canada (Procureur general) (12 June 1995), Doc. Montreal 50010-000189-959 (Quebec CA.).
102 Romania v. Cheng(3l December 1996), Doc. CA.131259.
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states to overcome the problems inherent in the strictly domestic
scope of criminal jurisdiction, hindering the ability of malfeasants
to hide behind such structural obstacles. On the domestic scene,
however, the relative power imbalance between the state and the
accused must be addressed by both the courts and the legislative
criminal justice scheme. As such, the question arises as to whether
the state's exclusive access to such means of procuring evidence is
desirable from a policy standpoint.
In Canada, the defence has available to it a great majority of the
evidence collected by the Crown due to the Stinchcombe103
disclosure requirements, and the accused is generally protected by
the Charter from that which is obtained unconstitutionally.
Therefore, evidence received by the Crown through a mutual legal
assistance request must be disclosed to the defence. However,
mutual legal assistance mechanisms give the Crown absolute
discretion with respect to which evidence is to be gathered in the
foreign jurisdiction. Thus, it is not unrealistic to contemplate an
unfair trial as a result of evidence beneficial to the defence being
unretrievable, perhaps even unknown to the defence, on this basis.
The government of Australia recently introduced an amendment
"which formalizes the role of the Attorney-General in seeking
foreign evidence at the request of the defence." 104 Should a
Canadian case ever be heard where foreign evidence is left
unsecured by the Crown in detriment to the defence, the courts
may implement a similar policy underpinned by section 7 of the
Charter. This raises the question: does the accused have the right
under section 7 to the same modes of access to evidence located in
foreign jurisdictions as the Crown? Must the search for such
evidence be facilitated by the Crown? The intuitive answer is no,
due to the fact that at international law, treaties give rise to rights
only as between the parties to them, which necessarily excludes
individuals. Moreover, the goal of the Charter in the criminal
context is to balance the disparity of resources between the
Supra note 66.
D. Stafford, "The Role of the International Association of Prosecutors in
Encouraging International Cooperation" (Paper presented to the International
Association of Prosecutors Annual Conference, 2 September 1997, Ottawa
[unpublished].
l03
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individual and the state. An expression of legislative preference on
this matter, however, is desirable.

ii. Form ofEvidence: Comparative Legal Divergence
As the Schreiber case, discussed below, indicates, the manner in
which evidence is gathered by the requested state and the form in
which it arrives in the requesting state can engage issues of both
domestic and international law. From the Canadian perspective, the
question is twofold: first, what kind of evidence is it acceptable to
receive from requested states? A related question would be whether
states which provide unusable evidence have violated their treaty
obligations. The second issue: where requests are made of Canadian
authorities, is it possible that our legal and constitutional restrictions
will bring us into breach of our duties at international law?
The answer to both questions will be a matter of practicality in
cooperation. As K. Prost notes, "[f]or mutual assistance to succeed,
the operative principle must be that requests will be executed in
accordance with the law of the requested state and, to the extent
not prohibited by that law, will be provided in the manner sought
by the requesting state." 105 This statement is in fact enshrined in the
Canada-u.s. Treaty, being a verbatim recitation of article VII(2). 106
It has obvious practical implications; for example, where Canada
makes a request of a civil law state for the results of a witness
examination, Canada will require a verbatim record of the witness
statements. However, civil law practice generally provides a proces
verbal or summary, which would be insufficient for Canadian
purposes. 107 A more effective means of facilitating cooperation
would be for the requesting states to reduce their expectations as to
the form which the evidence will take; this would, however, require
a massive international convergence on criminal procedure
standards, which would require an unlikely convergence of political
will. In the interests of practicality, it is hoped that the foreign
jurisdiction will be able to provide the evidence in a form usable in
Canada so long as it does not violate its own laws in the process,
and building such a good working relationship with the jurisdiction
105 Prost, supra note 12 at 22.
106 Canada-US. Treaty, supra
107 Prost,

supra note 12 at 23.

note 63.
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must be a matter of practical concern for the prosecution services of
cooperating states.
Yet the true issue is not the nature of the relationship with the
foreign jurisdiction, but the compatibility of legal traditions.
Mutual legal assistance between jurisdictions which have similar
legal traditions, such as those under the Commonwealth Scheme,
will be fairly trouble-free almost as a rule; likewise with nations of a
similar socio-economic standing. 108 However, an issue for Canadian
criminal justice will be the pursuit of evidence within the
jurisdiction of states with less compatible legal traditions,
particularly with respect to the rights of the individual. When
evidence is taken by authorities in these states, its arrival in Canada
may be met with Charter challenges to its admissibility. Where a
mutual legal assistance arrangement is in effect, can these states be
said to have violated their international legal obligations? The short
answer must be no; the treaties in their present form provide that
states shall pursue evidence in accordance with their own laws. And
yet this may be precisely the factor that brings the ongoing
foundation of legal assistance networks to a halt. Making requests
of states with comparable or "tougher" standards of conduct for the
authorities will create no insurmountable problems; on the other
hand, working arrangements with jurisdictions which acquire
evidence by practices unacceptable by Canadian standards may
prove more difficult. The only alternative-the breaking down of
the Canadian legal regime surrounding evidence which has evolved
over a century's practice-seems unlikely, particularly in the face of
Charter requirements.
The corollary scenario, where Canada's legal regime does not
allow us to acquire evidence which is sufficient for the requesting
state's purposes, hardly seems to present a similar problem. Where a
request is made of Canada by a state with a "looser" approach to
the rights of individuals at criminal law, Canada's standards are
unlikely to cause problems for the foreign authorities. A state with a
tougher set of standards will likely have a means, similar to
Canada's Charter, to exclude evidence which, while consistent with
practice in Canada, must be excluded under its regime.

!08 Such

as Switzerland. See Part V:3 below.
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V. CANADIAN REQUESTS: JURISPRUDENCE AND
THE CHARTER

The foregoing indicates that, while the Act has a few areas wherein
contention might arise, it has for the most part occupied a fairly
quiet, practical and uncontested corner of Canadian criminal
procedure. This can be attributed to the procedure to be followed
being consistent with Canadian law and practice despite that the
requests are made by foreign authorities. Such a policy is consistent
with the principle mentioned above: that the provision of assistance
insofar as it requires activity in domestic jurisdiction shall be carried
out according to the laws of that jurisdiction. Typical is the
Canada-US. Treaty, which states that a request "shall be executed in
accordance with the law of the Requested State and, to the extent
not prohibited by the law of the Requested State, in accordance
with the directions stated in the request." 109 This notion accords
with the close guarding of the criminal jurisdiction and is
predominantly uncontroversial.
In Canada, more profound questions have been dealt with by
the courts when Canada has made requests for assistance of other
countries, for use in investigations in Canada. The individual
freedom issues are obvious; since evidence will be gathered by the
police and prosecutors of foreign jurisdictions, it will be done in
accordance with foreign law. As such, persons attracting Charter
protection 110 who are under investigation are afforded none of their
domestic rights in the foreign jurisdiction. From a defence point of
view, this process could be characterized as an "end-run" around the
Charter. As will be demonstrated, while the process is on solid
ground at international law, it becomes more problematic where
international practice and the Charter meet.

1. R. v. Filonov 111
This case involved an RCMP investigation into drug-smuggling,
where a request was made of the American authorities pursuant to
the Canada-US. Treaty. The u.s. Drug Enforcement Agency
Canada-US. Treaty, supra note 63, art. VII (2).
That is, any person who falls into Canadian criminal jurisdiction.
lll (1993), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 516 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

l09
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executed two search warrants and seized documentary evidence,
which was handed over to the RCMP. The accused applied to have
the searches by the American authorities subjected to Charter
scrutiny, and to have the documents excluded based on section
24(2) of the Charter because certain procedural requirements under
Canadian law were not met. The Court, noting that the Charter is
to govern the relationship between the Canadian authorities and
residents, noted that the search had to be carried out according to
American procedural requirements, and:
by authorities who were in no way controlled by or
answerable to any Canadian authorities. The fact that the
process was initiated by the latter did nothing to make
their [u.s.] counterparts agents of the Canadian
government. Even if they could be so considered, their
conduct would not be governed by the Charter unless
the Charter expressly said as much. 112

The Court thus refused to extend the Charter's provisions to
foreign police cooperating with a Canadian investigation, where
they were operating within their own jurisdiction, and accordingly
quashed motions to have both the evidence and the warrants set
aside. It noted that a Charter remedy might have been available in
the face of evidence that the documents were obtained in such a
manner that the accused's rights were violated, but that this had
little to do with the issue of admissibility. 11 3

2. R. v. Terry114
The Supreme Court of Canada in Terry expanded on themes
regarding Charter application which had been touched upon by
Justice Dilks in Filonov. 11 5 Terry had fled to the u.s. after killing a
man in British Columbia, and was apprehended by American
authorities in California acting under an extradition warrant. At
issue was the Charter admissibility of evidence taken during the
questioning of Terry by the American authorities which was then
112 Ibid. at
11 3 Ibid. at

522-23.
521.
114 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207.
l15 Which case the Court referred to,

ibid. at 217.
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transmitted to Canadian police, though not, it appears, by way of a
treaty request. Nonetheless, the judgment of McLachlin J.
examined the treaty relationship in an interesting obiter dictum.
After stating dearly that a state's criminal law cannot apply outside
its boundaries, 116 the Court began to draw lines with regard to the
application of the Charter:
The practice of cooperation between police of different
countries does not make the law of one country
applicable in the other country. Bilateral mutual legal
assistance treaties negotiated under the authority of the
Mutual Legal Assistance
in
Criminal Matters
Act .. .stipulate that the actions requested of the assisting
state shall be undertaken in accordance with its own
laws ... Thus, if the Santa Rosa police in this case had been
responding to a treaty request, they would not have been
governed by the Charter. 11 7

Justice McLachlin further noted that a person arrested out of
jurisdiction is not left without a Charter remedy, as evidence could
be excluded on the basis of the section 11 (d) right to a fair trial, or
the accused's rights to fundamental justice under section 7 .118
A further dictum, however, indicated possible disagreement
among the members of the Court. Justice McLachlin noted that,
"even if one could somehow classify [the u.s. police] as 'agents' of
the Canadian police, so long as they operated in California they
would be governed by California law." 11 9 The Court felt it
unnecessary to decide on this factual issue. The statement is
somewhat at odds with a dictum by LaForest J. in R. v. Harrer,
where under similar circumstances it was stated that, "a different
issue would also arise if the United States policemen ... had been
acting as agents of the Canadian police .... " 120 In neither case did
the Court make any mention of what might constitute an "agency"
Citing at 216, LaF or est J. in R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 at para. 15:
"Canada cannot impose its procedural requirements in proceedings undertaken by
other states in their own territories." Terry had, in fact, been an intervenor in
Harrer 'shearing before the Supreme Court.
II7 Jbid. at216-17.
IIS Jbid. at 219.
11 9 Ibid. at 220.
120 Supra note 116 at para. 11.
116

118

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

relationship between police of different jurisdictions that would
trigger an application of the Charter to the police in the requested
state. LaForest's line of reasoning seems consistent with the opinion
that he expressed in Harrer that the Charter may apply
extraterritorially in some circumstances. 121 Yet under what
conditions can the police of one jurisdiction, acting within their
jurisdiction, be considered the agents of another? McLachlin's
dictum seems to indicate that a Treaty request will not actuate this
relationship, and the Court's findings in both Harrer and Terry
indicate that informal police cooperation as well will not serve this
purpose. 122 Yet a lack of further pronouncement on the issue,
coupled with the uncertainty of the Court's direction on the
Charter's scope, may give us pause. The Court's tiptoeing up to the
line of extraterritorial application of the Charter, however, will
undoubtedly have implications for the provision of mutual legal
assistance in the future.

3. Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney Genera/)123
The latest judgment on mutual legal assistance came from a
Federal Court of Appeal hearing on a spinoff issue of the Airbus
scandal. 124 Karlheinz Schreiber was the subject of a criminal
investigation on kickbacks allegedly received by him and other
parties (including former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney) for the
awarding of Canadian contracts to certain companies. During the
investigation, a letter of request 125 was sent by the Attorney General
of Canada to the Swiss authorities requesting records of bank
accounts held by Schreiber in that country, and the records were
seized in accordance with the request. The Attorney General did
121 Supra note 116 at paras. 10-12. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
relied upon this statement in a finding that a statement obtained by Canadian police
in the u .s. for use in the prosecution of a Canadian offence will be subject to s. lO(b)
of the Charter: R. v. Cook, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2615 (Q.L.).
122 See also Williams and Castel, supra note 55 at 320.
123 [1997] 2 F .C. 176 (CA.).
124 See"Mulroneypoisedfor new lawsuit over Airbus," The [Toronto} Globe &
Mail (18 November 1997) A4.
125 This was a letters rogatory request; the Treaty between Canada and the Swiss
Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters ([1995] Can. T .S. No. 24)
had not come into effect when the request was made.
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not obtain a search warrant or other judicial authorization prior to
the request. Schreiber contended that his right to security against
unreasonable search and seizure in section 8 of the Charter had been
infringed, as the process set out by the Court in Hunter126 and
Dyment127 was not followed. The Attorney General submitted that
the privacy right was not subject to Charter protection outside
Canada, because section 8 could not have extraterritorial effect.
The question put to the Federal Court Trial Division was:
Was the Canadian standard for the issuance of a search
warrant required to be satisfied before the Minister of
Justice and Attorney General of Canada submitted the
letter of request asking Swiss authorities to search for and
seize the plaintiff's banking documents and records? 128
The Trial Division had answered the question in the affirmative.
The disposition of the case found a two-thirds majority of the
Court of Appeal siding with Schreiber J.A., but subject to a
strongly-worded dissent by Stone J.A. The disagreement turned on
competing interpretations of the words contained in section 8. The
majority, relying on Hunter, used an expansive characterization of
the section and focused on the expectation of privacy that the
accused is to be afforded under the section, rather than the nature
of the alleged violation:
The question to be asked, therefore, is not whether a
letter of request is a "search." To answer that question
positively would require us to employ a very broad
meaning of the word. Rather, the question to be asked is
whether the letter of request jeopardizes the respondent's
reasonable expectation of privacy, his security against
unreasonable search and seizure. 129
The Court thus extended the section 8 protection to the entire
process surrounding a search and seizure, rather than just the
126 Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., (1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
127 R. v.Dyment, (1988] 2 S.C.R. 417. This case and Hunter

establish that, for a
search and seizure to be initiated, judicial approval on "reasonable and probable
grounds" must be obtained. See Hunter, ibid. at 160.
128 Supra note 123 at 185.
129 Supra note 123 at 228, Linden J A.
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physical act. Schreiber's Charter rights were judged to have been
engaged when the letter of request was sent, as this initiating action
was taken by a government body, and is therefore subject to the
Charter. While the facts of the case took place within the context of
a letters rogatory request, the practical effect will extend to a
request under treaty: "Canada will be required to obtain prior
judicial approval before a request can be sent to foreign
authorities." 130
The majority specifically rejected the submission of the
Attorney General that to extend Charter protection to the accused
in such an instance was to apply the Charter right extraterritorially.
While it acknowledged that a state cannot fetter the activities of
another state's authorities in the criminal context due to sovereignty
concerns, the Court drew a clear line between any activities by the
foreign authorities and the process being initiated on Canadian soil.
Insofar as a request is made for a search and seizure by Canadian
authorities with respect to an investigation into an offence under
Canadian law, the request itself must conform with the Charter
requirements. 131
In his dissent, Stone J.A. took issue with the majority's
interpretation of the section 8 protection, stating that they had
incorrectly emphasized the word "secure" at the expense of the
words "search" and "seizure." He concluded that the Charter right
could not apply to Schreiber because the documents were seized by
the Swiss police, operating under their own laws: "there was simply
no 'search' or 'seizure' in Canada to which section 8 ... could
attach." 132 Furthermore he found:
To conclude that [section 8] is engaged because the
Canadian authorities sent the request to Switzerland even
though they could not and did not conduct any search
and seizure there would be to contort the language of
130 Ibid.

at 192,StoneJA.
The Court appeared to find influential the fact that with the sending of the
request, the government had a "reasonable expectation of its acceptance, and a
likelihood of it being acted upon." It found that this was "sufficient to engage
section 8 of the Charter, particularly when the thrust of its protection ... is to
institute a means of preventing unjustified searches before they happen" supra note
123 at 236. The same would clearly be true of a treaty request.
132 Supra note 123 at 204.
131
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this important protection and to give it application where
no governmental action of the kind envisaged by the
section is involved. l33

Finding that the Canadian authorities could not carry out the
search and seizure themselves, he judged the request to be simply
standard intergovernmental cooperation not attracting Charter
scrutiny.
The majority decision in Schreiber is well-reasoned and
appealing from an individual rights point of view, and appears to be
consistent with the Supreme Court's objectives in Hunter.
Moreover, it seems to strike a proper balance between policy and
the protection of the individual: "A government cannot use the
need for international assistance as an excuse to justify its own
constitutionally impermissible conduct." 134 Yet the words of Stone
J.A. leave a few nagging doubts as to the proper ambit of the
Charter. The majority seems to dismiss out of hand the Attorney
General's "effective" submission that, "by banking in Switzerland,
the respondent gave up the protection of the Charter." 135 It also
rejected a proposed parallel with Harrer, where McLachlin J. noted
in the context of the section 1O(b) right to counsel that the right
"appertains to the time of arrest or detention," and thus could not
apply to a foreign authority carrying out the interrogation. 136 But is
the parallel such an unreasonable one? Could the right to protection
against search and seizure not be said to more properly "appertain"
at the time of its physical violation? The protection afforded by
section 8 is to apply to "unreasonable search and seizure"; while
neither side of the judgment in Schreiber chose to focus on this, the
inclusion of the word "unreasonable" would seem to indicate a
focus on the activity itself-more in line with the interpretation of
Stone ].A. The accused still has open to him or her an application to
exclude the evidence if it violates sections 11 (b) or 7, i.e. if the
evidence-gathering conduct has been grievous.
From a policy perspective, too, the judgment of the Court in
Schreiber may be seen to have negative implications. The need for
l33 Ibid. at

207.

!34 Ibid. at 225.
135 Supra note 123 at 221.
136 Ibid. at 223.
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the level of section 8 protection prescribed by the Court will
necessitate judicial approval of virtually every request made of a
foreign state for evidence, which cannot but compromise the
efficiency for which current techniques of mutual legal assistance
are designed. Furthermore, this would seem to put the Charter's
objectives at odds with the leeway needed in the fight against
international crime, a fight approved of by the Supreme Court in
Cotroni. 137 The Court in Schreiber has perhaps indirectly
acknowledged this problem, where it stated that, "[t]he spectre of
the need for legislative action cannot inhibit the Court from
declaring unconstitutional conduct to be [so]. " 138 Yet such
pronouncements can further tie the hands of the state in its pursuit
and prosecution of a brand of crime which is by nature intransigent
and difficult to halt, and turn the Charter's domestic focus on
individual rights loose in an area where its restrictions may, in the
larger scope, undermine its peace and public order objectives by
compromising the ability of the state to combat international
criminals.
The Court's invocation of "the spectre of the need for legislative
action" seems to suggest that its judges envision a political response,
a use of legislation to unbind the powers of the prosecution. Yet
such an expectation is ingenuous at best, given that any new legal
structure will be viewed through the same Charter lens as the
present legislation, a lens which has clearly affirmed the rights of
the individual being investigated by the state. It is submitted that
the level of protection already afforded by the Charter is sufficient
in this instance, particularly given the need for efficiency and speed
in the investigation of international crimes. A society in which the
power to combat such an insidious and slippety brand of crime is
limited is one wherein the rights of all citizens are curtailed, one
wherein the wheels of justice are deadlocked-one wherein crime
does pay. While such a limitation of the right to privacy may
constitute a violation of the language of section 8, it would certainly
constitute a limitation that is reasonable and just in the overall
interests of our democratic society, and could thus be shielded
under section 1. Allowing unfettered international cooperation in
137 Supra
138

note 6.
Schreiber, supra note 123 at 241.
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evidence-gathering, while providing under sections 7 and 11 (b) for
exclusion of such evidence as is deemed impermissible at trial,
surely will not lower the Charter bar unacceptably. As the Schreiber
decision is under appeal to the Supreme Court, 139 this question will
continue to be of significance.

VII. CONCLUSION
Canada's famed "internationalism" has always in
featured a
juxtaposition of conflicting trends, lending a certain bipolar quality
to national will on the subject. While an initiator and enthusiastic
participant in efforts to formulate and advance the goals of
international law, Canada's implementation thereof has been
hindered by the reluctance of national courts to incorporate
customary international legal duties into judicial decision making
when they appear to conflict with a statute. 140 As well, our
troublesome federal system has made our status as parties to
international treaty the subject of both internal division and
international criticism. 141 In the area of mutual legal assistance, it
seems clear that the mechanisms which allow us greater facility in
fighting international crime will be held back by a determination
not to let pressing external need interfere with the courts' Charterbased deconstruction of the "peace and public order" mandate;
witness the Supreme Court's slow but sure extension of the Charter
to matters beyond our borders. Yet such a stance has the potential
to be self-defeating, as unfettered jurisdiction-hopping lawbreakers
rob legal systems of their prosecutorial legitimacy.
In some ways, Canada's domestic law orientation stance on
mutual legal assistance would seem entirely consistent with
international practice. Characteristic of virtually all inter-state
relationships in this area are reservations relating to the interests of
state sovereignty and jurisdiction, allowing parties to refuse
cooperation if it is seen to be contrary to ill-defined "national
[1998] S.C.C. Bulletin 138.
See the Foreign. Legations Case, [1943] S.C.R. 208; Gordon v. R. in Right of
Canada, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 668 (B.C.S.C.); affd [1980] 6 W.W.R. 519 (B.C.CA.).
l4l See R. St.]. Macdonald, "International Treaty Law and the Domestic Law of
Canada" (1975) 2 Dalhousie L.J. 307.
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interests", or limiting its operation to practice permitted under
domestic law. And this, too, is consistent with the close guarding of
criminal jurisdiction.
However, such trends only underline the profound barriers
which continue to restrain the effectiveness of the battle against
international crime. It is difficult to envision police and
prosecutorial authorities conducting their activities according to
anything but their own laws and procedures; yet this is precisely the
weakness upon which the perpetrators of transnational crime prey.
Without some integration of criminal systems, without a
jurisdictional "dropping of borders" commensurate with the
emerging degree of economic interdependence, the battle will
continue to be a losing one. Mutual legal assistance treaties such as
we know them, even combined with the network of treaties in areas
such as extradition, represent but a first step.
Efforts are being made in this regard, particularly in the
European forum 142 where co-mingling of jurisdictions does not
meet with the fierce opposition it does elsewhere. As Williams and
Castel wrote in 1981, "[a] reasonable solution for preventing
criminals escaping trial for their activities, by involving several
states, lies in the universal acceptance of elastic jurisdictional
principles which can be molded to fit the realities of modern-day
crime." 143 Nearly two decades later the means towards the
implementation of such a "universal acceptance" are slowly evolving
as the tools of the trade of police forces and prosecuting authorities,
in the form of extradition arrangements, mutual legal assistance
mechanisms, and coordination in the pursuit of the proceeds of
crime, among others. Yet Canada continues to maintain itself in the
highly insular, sovereign camp, bound by jurisdictional
entanglement. To make a meaningful contribution to the battle
against international crime, not to mention meeting the needs of its
own populace, Canada must be willing to adopt a more
internationalist approach to constitutionalism and due process so
that the lofty and worthwhile goal of "peace and public order" may
have some chance of being realized.
142

For example, the 1990 Convention on La.undering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation ofthe Proceeds from Crime reprinted in Gilmore, supra note 3 at 78.
!43 Williams and Castel, supra note 55 at vii.

